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1I. Introduction 
An aging nuclear reactor sits in Kinshasa, Congo.  It was developed in the 1950s, 
as part of the American effort to win over popular appeal during the Cold War.  Like all 
contemporary nuclear reactors in use, it is powered by materials that could, by remote 
possibility, be converted into a nuclear weapon.  During some of the more difficult times 
in Congo’s recent history, this reactor has sat unmonitored by local and international 
authorities; as the Bush administration looked for reasons to start a war with Iraq, this 
reactor was occasionally mentioned as a source of material for Saddam Hussein’s nuclear 
weapon.1 The problems associated with reactors like this have motivated contemporary 
foreign policy, and the implications of this policy (or lack thereof), are the subject matter 
of this paper. 
The evolution of the nuclear technology has presented policy challenges to the 
United States, both domestically and abroad, in dealing with the problems of nuclear 
technology.  Clearly, there are advantages to nuclear energy.  It is relatively inexpensive 
for the amount of energy produced, meaning it can be used in relatively fossil fuel poor 
nations.  It does not emit carcinogenic air pollution or carbon dioxide, making it an 
important component for any nation coming to terms with air pollution.  There are 
obvious drawbacks to the technology.  The waste generated by the nuclear fuel cycle is 
extremely dangerous and must be kept away from humans.  Nuclear plants, with a remote 
capability for accident and remote possibility of a terrorist attack, require a great deal of 
security and bureaucratic oversight, thus making their use very expensive.  There is also 
 
1 Douglas Pasternak & Eleni E. Dimmler, A Home-Grown Nuclear Threat, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT Sept. 23, 2002, at 40. 
2the relationship between civilian and military applications of nuclear technology, posing 
a number of modern challenges to policymakers.   
This paper examines that relationship between military applications and civilian 
uses of that technology, focusing on the methods taken by the United States to address 
this relationship.  In order to understand the policies taken by the US, it is first necessary 
to analyze the history of the technology, the aspects of nuclear technology that enable 
security threats, the history of the US response to those threats, the current US policy on 
the issue, and finally, how that policy could be improved.  This paper’s overarching 
argument is that, because nuclear energy is a necessary component of an international 
energy strategy that will address the world’s increasing energy demand, the US should 
promote nuclear technology, but only if it is willing to address the risk of proliferation 
related to this technology.  This analysis concludes by examining three questions. 1) 
Should the United States promote the use of nuclear energy? 2) What measures can be 
taken to ameliorate the proliferation risks posed by nuclear energy? 3) Is the present 
division of labor appropriate within the federal government appropriate to address the 
myriad of issues created by the unique nature of nuclear technology? 
In order to address those issues, it is necessary to examine the history of the US 
response to nuclear energy, the technology that enables nuclear energy, and the current 
response to nuclear proliferation. 
II. History in United States: The Between of Military and Civilian Uses of Nuclear 
Technology 
The nuclear energy industry was the result of the efforts of US military scientists 
during the 1930s and 1940s.  During this period, the US explored military applications of 
3nuclear energy, focusing on how energy could be developed from the splitting of uranium 
atoms.  The impact of this new area of science would affect all life in the world.  In order 
to understand the current regulatory framework of nuclear energy, it is first necessary to 
understand the origins of the US policy response towards this technology. 
A. Domestic Law and Policy  
Nuclear energy literally began with a big bang: the attacks on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki were the result of the US efforts during World War II.  The technology and 
science that developed these weapons is, and will always be, related to the energy 
resource that followed it.  After World War II, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act 
of 19462 in order to address the profound implications of this new technology on 
America, both militarily and economically.  While unsure of the long term implications 
of the technology, Congress was concerned with shaping the direction of the industry, 
“subject at all times to the paramount objective of assuring the common defense and 
security, the development and utilization of atomic energy shall, so far as practicable, be 
directed toward improving the public welfare, increasing the standard of living, 
strengthening free competition in private enterprise, and promoting world peace.”3
President Eisenhower followed suit in the 1950s with the Atoms for Peace Program 
which encouraged peaceful use of nuclear technology and served the political aspirations 
of the US during the Cold War.  From the beginning of the nuclear era, the federal 
government has been concerned with the implications of this technology for security and 
foreign policy goals.  As a result of this concern, the federal government has sought to 
shape the technology through a variety of legal and bureaucratic devices. 
 
2 Law of 1946, Ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755. 
3 Id. at §1(a). 
41. Atomic Energy Act.   
Among the notable aspects of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (AEA) was the 
decision by Congress to make the nuclear industry a government monopoly, allowing for 
private groups to invest, subject to a great deal of federal oversight.4 The AEA’s purpose 
is to regulate the various materials involved in the nuclear process.  Under the current 
form of the law, the DOE has oversight of source materials5, special nuclear materials6,
and byproducts.7
Congress found two primary motivations.  First, there was the need for atonement 
after the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which served as an impetus for developing 
peaceful applications of nuclear energy.8 Second, and very much ironically, there was a 
need to pursue the technology for purposes of the Cold War.9 There was a relationship, 
from the beginning, between developments in military and civilian applications of 
nuclear technology.  For example, the light water reactor, a model frequently used in 
American nuclear power plants, was developed by the navy for use on submarines. 
 
4 Id. at §7. 
5 Source material is uranium, thorium, or any other material deemed by the NRC to be deemed source material and ores containing 
those materials.  42 U.S.C. §  2091 (2000).   
6 “Special nuclear material” refers to plutonium, enriched uranium (isotope 233 or isotope 235).  42 U.S.C. § 2151 (2000). 
7 This refers to any radioactive material made radioactive by exposure to radiation or other nuclear material.  42 U.S.C. § 2073 
(2000). 
8 Diane Carter Maleson , Legal Response to Nuclear Power, 55 SO. CAL. L. REV. 597, 598-600 (1982) 
9 See Adam Tanner, Nuclear power at a standstill; Power from 103 reactors provides 20 percent of U.S. electricity. Few people 
clamor publicly, though, for more nuclear energy, despite high oil prices, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Oct. 10, 2004, at A25, available 
at 2004 WL 94427478.
5The act initially created the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which was 
responsible for licensing and energy development functions.  The Energy Reorganization 
Act of 1974 split these functions into the liscencing and energy development functions,10 
creating the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Energy Research and 
Development Administration (ERDA, the organization which eventually became the 
DOE).  The NRC is charged, by Congress, with the health and safety aspects of the 
industry.   
While safety is traditionally a state function, the original AEA was silent on the 
matter.  In 1957, the law was amended to allow nominal state involvement in the 
regulation of byproducts, source materials, and small quantities of special nuclear 
materials.11 States and the NRC sign agreements related to these regulations, after a 
finding by the NRC that the state’s radiation control program is congruent with federal 
intentions.12 States are also responsible for regulating nuclear energy with regard to their 
energy production as part of a utility system. 
B. Price Anderson Insurance 
Another important step in the process of creating a commercial nuclear industry 
was the Price Anderson13 “umbrella” for nuclear power operators.  Given the almost 
unfathomable cost of a nuclear accident in the context of the American legal system, 
Congress realized that the fledgling nuclear industry at the time, which operated on the 
similar margins to other utility producers, would be unable to pay the cost of insurance.  
 
10 42 U.S.C. § 5801, et al (2000). 
11 42 U.S.C. §  2021 (2000). 
12 Id.
13 42 U.S.C. 2210(c) (2000). 
6Over the past five decades, Congress has developed a tiered system, in which nuclear 
producers share the insurance cost for accidents to a certain amount and Congress agrees 
to pay the rest in the event of a catastrophic accident. 
C.  Nuclear Energy in the courts 
The legal system has had a limited response with the challenges of nuclear 
energy, interpreting the Atomic Energy Act and the Price Anderson provisions.  In 
Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota,14 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that 
the federal government preempted the state authority to regulate nuclear power plant 
operation and construction, allowing the AEC’s authority to regulate release from nuclear 
plants.  Another notable case, In re TMI Litigation Cases Consol. II, discusses the history 
of federal regulation of nuclear energy in depth, illustrating the method used to 
appropriate responsibility over nuclear energy, such as the Price Anderson system. 
The overwhelming theme from the courts theme with regard to nuclear energy, 
however, has been one of deference.15 One commentator, Diane Carter Maleson, has 
noted that American courts are often very conservative with regard to emerging 
technologies and social concerns, comparing the deference of the courts with regard to 
nuclear energy to the slow response of the courts to address the problems created by 
 
14 Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 114749 (8th Cir. 1971) 
15 There are a few notable exceptions.  See Int’l Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers, AFL-CIO v. U.S., 280 F.2d 645 (1960) 
(overturning an AEC approval of a breeder reactor project because it did not meet the safety standards in the Atomic Energy Act).  On 
appeal, the US Supreme Court overturned the district court’s decision, again deferring to the AEC’s authority.  Power Reactor Dev. 
Co. v. Int’l Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers, AFL-CIO, 367 U.S. 396 (1961).  See also Porter County Chapter of  the Izaak 
Walton League of America, Inc. v. AEC, 515 F.3d 513 (7th. Cir. 1975) (holding that AEC grant of permit for plant violated its own 
citing regulations).  The circuit court was reversed. N.Indiana  Pub. Serv. Co. v. Porter County Chapter of  the Izaak Walton League of 
America, Inc., 423 U.S. 12 (1975). 
7industrialization in the 1800s.16 Moreover, Carter notes that this deference is inspired by 
judicial trust in the technocratic regime, which she views as a policy choice in of itself: 
by deferring to administrative judgment, Carter argues that the court has changed nuclear 
energy from an “option” to a “mandate.”17 
D. Analysis: Lessons of the Bureaucracy 
These cases are particularly notable because they illustrate a unique aspect of the 
American nuclear system vis-à-vis that of other nations, namely the impact of the 
bureaucratic system of checks and balances that regulate all aspects of American nuclear 
technology.  There are lessons to be learned regarding this system for comparative 
purposes.   In the United States, there is a comprehensive system of checks and balances 
to ensure the appropriate divide between the goals and needs of industry and of the 
government.  The federal government defines interests – security, safety, and an energy 
supply – and the appropriate entities – the military, the various civilian government 
entities at the state and federal level, the entrepreneurs – act in accord with that policy.   
One of the major problems that shapes US nuclear policy is that this sort of 
system does not exist in every nation around the world.  In one way or another, a few of 
the emerging nuclear states lack the sort of technocratic structure to divide those 
responsibilities.  In some instances, those shortcomings create potential security risks for 
the United States, like the problem in Congo, and these sorts of problems are the focus of 
this analysis.  The next step is discussing how the technology creates those risks.  
III. The Nuclear Energy Process and Military Applications 
 
16 Diane Carter Maleson, Legal Response to Nuclear Power, 55 So. CAL. L. REV. 597, 605 (1982). 
17 Id. At 639-640. 
8Nuclear energy utilizes a relatively simple atomic reaction to generate steam 
which creates energy.  There are several different technologies that have been developed 
to utilize this science and they each warrant specific explanation.  These technologies can 
be used through a variety of means to develop nuclear weapons. 
A. How does Nuclear energy work?   
1. Generally 
The short answer to the question of how a nuclear reactor works is that it releases 
energy from uranium and plutonium, which in turn is used to create heat that in turn heats 
water, which finally generates steam.  A nuclear reaction creates the heat that leads to the 
electricity.  There are several different ways to achieve this reaction, but there seems to 
be one fundamental model of how to achieve it.   
Uranium has very unstable nuclei, some of which are continually breaking up or 
disintegrating.  When the neutrons within uranium atoms collide with the nuclei of other 
uranium atoms, two or three neutrons will be released and the reaction will generate 
energy – this is the “fissioning process.”  Isotopes of uranium, U-235 and U-238, have 
different properties from standard uranium.  U-235 can more easily capture a neutron, 
fission, and release energy than a reaction, compared to U-238.  However, U-238 is 
important because it can be used to form the element plutonium, through the absorption 
of neutrons.  Nuclei of plutonium fission in a similar manner to uranium and are 
frequently used in commercial nuclear reactors.  About forty percent of commercial 
electricity comes from plutonium.18 
18 MAX W. CARBON, NUCLEAR POWER: VILLAIN OR VICTIM? 9 (1997). [Hereinafter Carbon.] 
9Generally, nuclear reactor has four parts: uranium or a combination of uranium 
and plutonium, water, devices that control the rate of fission, and a radiation shield.19 
Uranium is usually shaped into small rods – normally referred to as fuel rods – to 
improve efficiency.  Fuel rods are normally one-half inch in diameter and several feet in 
length. 
2.  Nuclear Fuel 
Those who follow the news frequently hear nuclear-related terminology.  It is 
worth briefly touching on the types of nuclear fuel used in reactors.  The most important 
ingredient for a nuclear reaction is uranium: a relatively rare element.20 In order to utilize 
uranium for many civilian and military applications, uranium must be enriched. Yellow 
Cake is processed uranium concentrate, containing seventy to ninety percent uranium 
oxide content.  It is crushed, or compressed, uranium that is used in the enrichment 
process.21 
Enriched uranium has a higher U-235 content through a process called isotope 
separation: several different methods, such as centrifugation and gas diffusion,22 have 
been developed to bring the U-235 content in fuel rods from three percent to five percent 
 
19 Carbon, supra note 18, at 11 
20 See World Uranium Resources (RAR), available at http://www.antenna.nl/wise/uranium/img/uresw.gif (last updated 1/1/2001) 
(showing locations of uranium worldwide). 
21 See BBC News, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/world/2003/nuclear_fuel_cycle/conversion/default.stm (last 
updated Oct. 7, 2004) (explaining the yellow cake process and the uranium enrichment process). 
22 Gas diffusion is the most frequently used technique in American nuclear reactors.  The history of these processes is important to 
the history of the industry as a whole.  A substantial amount of the Manhattan Project was dedicated to researching such processes.
See Richard L. GARWIN  & GEORGES CHARPAK, MEGAWATTS AND MEGATONS: A TURNING POINT FOR THE NUCLEAR AGE? 49-50 
(2001). [Hereinafter Garwin and Charpak.]  See also BBC News, Nuclear Fuel Cycle, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/world/2003/nuclear_fuel_cycle/enrichment/default.stm (last updated Oct. 7, 2004) (illustrating the 
nuclear fuel cycle in some detail). 
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(up from the natural content of seventy one hundredths of a percent).23 This content 
allows the fuel rods in a reactor to be placed closer together, allowing for more fission to 
occur.24 
Plutonium does not occur (in useful amounts) anywhere in nature, at least 
anywhere that has been discovered yet.  Plutonium, a fundamental ingredient in nuclear 
weapons,25 is obtained through a number of processes, two of which warrant specific 
attention.  Plutonium is a byproduct in all civilian reactors at the moment, although 
military reactors are developed to create plutonium more efficiently – much of the 
plutonium created in civilian reactors is difficult to utilize for any re-use.  Reprocessing 
plants, such as Breeder reactors, create plutonium that can be re-used as fuel within the 
reactor.   
Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) accounts for between two percent and one third of the 
nuclear fuel used today.26 It is derived from re-processed plutonium and is generally very 
costly to make.  A discussion of MOX will be important in the discussion of Cooperative 
Threat Reduction below. 
 
23 Garwin and Charpak, supra note 22, at 48. 
24 Id. at 46-47. 
25 For a nuclear weapon to work, an explosive chain reaction must take place.  By enabling more neutrons to react, the material reacts 
and generates more and more neutrons to react in a microsecond.  In a nuclear reactor, the energy process is designed to maintain a 
chain reaction by regulating the system of fissioning so that only one neutron reacts at a time in the fission (control rods absorb the 
excess neutrons). Garwin and Charpak, supra note 22, at 34-35. 
26 Estimates over the amount used tend to vary, depending on who is writing the analysis.  One estimate places it as 2%, but growing 
slowly. World Nuclear Ass’n, Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX), available at http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf29.htm (last updated July 
2003).   
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Finally, thorium, another naturally occurring element, has been used in some 
nuclear reactors as an alternative to uranium based fuels.27 There are some advocates 
who believe it can be developed into fuel that could not be used for nuclear weapons. 
B.  Reactor Types 
 A number of processes have been developed to utilize the reactions of uranium.  
Each has advantages and disadvantages. 
 1. Natural Uranium Reactors 
Rather than use a uranium isotope, these reactors use the natural form of 
uranium.28 This operation requires heavy-water moderator at atmospheric pressure: it is 
designed to limit the energy within fast fission neutrons, allowing the small proportion of 
uranium-235 nuclei within the material to be fissioned.29 These reactors do not need the 
thick steel pressure vessels within other reactors.  The advantage of these reactors is that 
they do not need the processing that comes with other reactors.  The disadvantage is that 
they are not as efficient as the more advanced reactors, because they do not use refined 
uranium.  
2. Water Reactors 
In a light water reactor, water enters the reactor and then becomes steam as it 
passes through the reactor.  These fuel rods are inserted into a reactor in a chamber filled 
with water.  Water slows the pace of the neurons because they lose energy as the uranium 
 
27 Thorium, which when used in a reactor core becomes U-233, was tested during the Manhattan Project, but has been disfavored 
because U-235 was viewed as a better fuel source.  Seth Grae, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s Obligation to Transfer 
Peaceful Nuclear Technology: One Proposal of a Technology, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1985, 1993 (1996).  Thorium is three times as 
abundant as uranium.  WIKIPEDIA, Thorium, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thorium (last updated Nov. 27, 2004). 
28 There is one such reactor that has occurred naturally in Gabon, given a high concentration of water and uranium in the area. 
29 Garwin and Charpak, supra note 22, at 81. 
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neutrons react to the hydrogen in the water.30 The water is pumped away from the 
uranium rods to carry the heat out of the chamber and to generate the steam that in turn 
generates electricity.31 Control rods, normally made of boron, regulate the rate of fission, 
use the element boron to absorb excess neutrons within the reactor.   The steam created 
from the system spins a turbine and energy is created.  Similarly, in a pressurized water 
reactor, leaves the reactor, and is then passed through the tubes in a heat exchanger; heat 
from that water makes its way from the system and boils another, separate, supply of 
water.32 
One benefit of the system is that it can safely create energy much more efficiently 
than natural uranium reactors.  One of the benefits of nuclear energy which has not been 
specifically mentioned is the relatively low cost of uranium, given the relative amount of 
energy one can generate from the material.  With this benefit comes a major long term 
problem: the limitation of these types of reactors is that there is a limited amount of 
uranium in the world.  Indeed, some estimates posit that the supply of “easy-to-reach” 
material, given current demands, will only last another century.33 Other drawbacks are 
common to most reactor types: highly dangerous nuclear waste and the (remote) 
possibility that the waste material is reprocessed into a weapon.  
3.  Liquid Metal Reactors 
 A more modern development in nuclear technology attempts to address the 
limitation of supply.  Liquid metal reactors (“LMRs”), also called Breeder reactors, 
 
30 Carbon, supra note 18, at 12. 
31 Id. 
32 Carbon, supra note 18, at 13. 
33 Id. at 79. 
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consume less U-235 than plutonium generated, producing a net increase in fissionable 
material.  
A reader with a basic knowledge of physics might be troubled by this concept, 
given the Second Law of Thermodynamics: "in all energy exchanges, if no energy enters 
or leaves the system, the potential energy of the state will always be less than that of the 
initial state."34 The simple answer to this challenge is that it does not create an unlimited 
amount of nuclear energy; fuel rods still must be replaced after some time.  Rather, the 
difference between this type of reactor and other types that account for the challenge is 
that breeder reactors reprocess the waste product of the fission reaction (plutonium) into 
fuel that other reactors cannot use.  The reactor is able to generate more plutonium than 
more traditional reactors because it uses metal sodium as a coolant.   
Metal sodium has a higher melting point than water (208°F compared to 32°F).  
One of the benefits of this process is that metal sodium does not slow neutrons down as 
much as water, making more neutrons available for the U-238 at the capture point, and 
thus forming more plutonium.35 
In order to separate the useable nuclear fuel from the waste, the spent fuel is 
chopped and dissolved through an acid bath process.36 Uranium and plutonium are 
recovered and the remaining material is neutralized.  This portion of the “fuel cycle 
process” is very expensive, requiring a great deal of safety measures given the the highly 
radioactive nature of some of the materials.37 
34 Second Law of Thermodynamics. 
35 Carbon, supra note 18, at 78-79. 




In the 1940s, some predicted that the first reactors would be liquid metal reactors.  
The U.S. Navy developed water-cooled reactors with a great deal of success, and these 
systems were eventually adopted by the US nuclear industry.  A number of other nations 
have also experimented with the technology – England, France, India, Japan, China, and 
Russia – but to little serious success, other than limited commercial use in Russia and 
Japan.  The Ford and Carter administrations stopped US development of technology, but 
the Bush Administration has interest in it.38 
The benefits of this process are clear.39 It lowers the cost of producing nuclear 
energy and somewhat limits the waste product of the reaction.  One of the drawbacks of 
this technology is that the fuel rods must be discharged periodically and chemically 
reprocessed.  A major problem with this detail, as noted by the Ford, Carter, and Clinton 
administrations, is that the breeder reactor creates a pure form of plutonium which can be 
harnessed for a weapon.40 
38 The Ford and Cater Administrations hoped to send a message to the rest of the world by rejecting the process, hoping others would 
follow suit.  See also Henry Sokolski, Taking Proliferation Seriously, POLICY REVIEW, at 51, Oct. 1, 2003 (describing the Bush 
administration’s efforts to encourage breeder reactors in other nations and the administration’s consideration of repealing the ban on 
reprocessing within the US).   
39 See A. David Rossin,  U.S. Policy on Spent Fuel Reprocessing, Frontline, (1998), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/readings/rossin.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2004) (advocating the benefits of 
reprocessing).  See also Spurgeon M. Kenney, Jr., Plutonium Reprocessing: Twenty Years Experience (1977-1997), FRONTLINE,
(1998), available at  http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/readings/keeny.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2004). 
40 Carbon, supra note 18, at 80. 
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4.  Integral Fast Reactors 
One recent development in the technology, known as the Integral Fast Reactor 
(“IFR”), uses a different form of chemical processing and different form of fuel rod.41 
The process never creates pure plutonium – instead, it utilizes mixed fragments within the 
fuel cycle process, both fission materials and transuranic elements, making diversion very 
difficult.  In the event the material is stolen, a bomb could not be made without further 
chemical separation.42 
5. Thorium Reactors 
Another relatively recent technology is the Radkowsky Thorium Reactor, which 
uses thorium in the fuel rods, in combination with other fissionable pre-made material, to 
create a theoretically diversion proof reactor.43 The main limitation with thorium reactors 
has been that the process of using thorium is costly and requires the use of pre-made 
fissionable material (which often could be reprocessed).  The Radkowsky reactor 
addresses this problem by separating the U-235 from the thorium into separate processes, 
thus dividing the component into one which creates neutrons for energy and fuel 
management.44 
41 See FRONTLINE, Interview with Dr. Charles Till, available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/interviews/till.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2004) (discussing IFR technologies 
and the political decision that ended the research program). 
42 Id.at 80.  A demonstration reactor, using this technology, was developed and tested in Idaho in 1995, but the Clinton administration 
discontinued the program.  Carbon, supra note 18, at 80. 
43 See Paul R. Kasten, SCIENCE AND GLOBAL SECURITY (Overseas Publishing Association, 1998) 237-269, available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/~globsec/publications/pdf/7_3kasten.pdf (discussing the technology and its feasibility). 
44 Seth Grae, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s Obligation to Transfer Peaceful Nuclear Technology: One Proposal of a 
Technology, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1985, 1994 (1996).   
16
 
B. How can this process be used to develop nuclear weapons? 
1. Fuel Rod Theft and Reprocessing 
The uranium used in fuel rods cannot be used to make a bomb.  The U-235 
content in “enriched uranium” is around four or five percent; a mixture of U-235 and U-
238 would, at least, have to be twenty percent U-235 to be explosive.45 Similarly, the 
plutonium that might be in fuel rods would also be difficult to transform into a bomb.  
There is no plutonium in fresh fuel rods, so terrorists would have to steal spent fuel.  The 
spent fuel itself is stored in casks and usually surrounded with security.  Even if one 
could obtain a used fuel rod, it is extremely difficult to separate plutonium into a pure 
form needed to make a bomb.  Such a process requires a means of shielding oneself from 
a high degree of radiation and the technology and knowledge to separate the material.46 
Additionally, the fuel rods within commercial reactors are used for three or four years at a 
time, due to their high cost; this leads to many impurities, making it difficult to develop 
the material into a weapon.47 
The more pertinent threat at the moment comes from advanced nuclear reactors 
that create a type of plutonium, through reprocessing that is more useful in weapon-
making.  In certain Soviet-style reactors, like the graphite-water reactor used in 
Chernobyl, the tendency was to replace the fuel much more frequently than normal 
reactors, as these reactors could generate a relatively large amount of plutonium, for 
 
45 Carbon, supra note 18, at 63. 
46 Id. at  64-65. 
47 Carbon, supra note 18, at 65. 
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weapons, while providing energy.48 The sole purpose of traditional reprocessing plants is 
to separate plutonium and uranium from the used fuel, so those materials can be re-used: 
this means that a nation that can obtain a reprocessing facility has the capability of 
creating a great deal of plutonium in a short time.49 
2. Alternative Diffusion 
Another facet of nuclear technology is that commercial reactors are not a likely 
candidate for plutonium processing.   For example, plutonium can be processed in a more 
covert non-commercial reactor.  In North Korea, this has usually been the issue – rather 
than develop nuclear reactors for energy purposes, the regime tends to favor more covert 
military development.50 The majority of news coverage involving nuclear proliferation 
centers on these issues, as a nation state clearly has much more ability in terms of 
financing and organization to develop such materials into a weapon.  These nations tend 
to focus on obtaining dual use technology, attempting to mask their military efforts for 
civil operations. 
3. Waste 
Finally, a fear that developed in the popular media after 9/11 was that terrorists 
could somehow obtain other nuclear waste material for use in a “dirty bomb” that would 
utilize the radiological effects of the nuclear material.  There is no single definition of a 
dirty bomb – generally, the term refers to terrorists using nuclear material in a crude, non-
conventional form, such as designing a method to expose a civilian to radiation without 
 
48 Garwin and Charpak, supra note 22, at 315. 
49 PETER BECK, PROSPECTS AND STRATEGIES FOR NUCLEAR POWER: GLOBAL BOON OR DANGEROUS DIVERSION? (Earthscan, 1994) 
12. 
50 Id. at 69. 
18
utilizing an active fissile reaction.  The problem with analyzing the threat from a dirty 
bomb is that there is not a simple means of using the material as a weapon.   
Most of the scenarios contemplated by security analysts deal with hypotheticals 
that have not yet happened. Some studies have calculated little risk to such accidents.51 
There are other real life stories that nuclear material has led to some alarming results.52 
Whatever the risk, after 9/11, the world is much more cognizant of the risks posed by 
terrorism. 
IV. US Policy Actions in Response to the Threat of Reprocessing and Proliferation 
The US has developed a number of policies aimed at curbing the threats of 
proliferation.  They range from technological solutions to diplomatic solutions.  While 
the US has had some success in the area of curbing proliferation, it appears there is much 
more that could be done to address the issue. 
A.  “Cooperative Threat Reduction” (“CTR”) 
A result of the efforts of US Senator Richard Lugar and former Senator Sam 
Nunn, the “Nunn-Lugar” program, otherwise known as Cooperative Threat Reduction, 
attempts to address the uses of loose nuclear weapon materials in Russia and other 
nations.  The fear is that Russian nuclear weapon or reactor components could be bought 
from, or stolen from, Russian facilities, given their lax security measure.  Continuing the 
 
51 See BERNARD L. COHEN, THE NUCLEAR ENERGY OPTION: AN ALTERNATIVE FOR THE 90S (1990), 221 (discussing a Sandia 
National Laboratory Study in which an experiment showed that exploding a truck filled with nuclear waste in Manhattan would have a 
twenty percent risk of killing one person). 
52 Id. at 22-223 (describing the Kyshtym incident, in which misuse of radioactive waste created a dangerous chemical explosion in the 
former Soviet Union around 1957-1958). 
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consistent theme of this issue’s complexity, the task of dismantling these weapons has 
proven very difficult.53 
1. Policy 
While plutonium reprocessing is a much publicized portion of the CTR program, 
the program is much bigger.  It has four broad goals: (1) Destroying nuclear, chemical, 
and other weapons of mass destruction; (2) transportation and safe storage of these 
weapons and materials; (3) establishing verifiable safeguards with regard to these 
weapons and material; and, (4) preventing the diversion of scientific expertise regarding 
nuclear technology.54 
2. Technical Process 
Generally, there are two major nuclear-related processes to the CTR program.  
One program buys the enriched uranium from Russian weapons, re-processing it into 
nuclear fuel.  The problem with this process is that it costs substantially more to produce 
MOX fuel for sale than it does to buy the more conventional uranium fuel.  To encourage 
the use of MOX, the US plans to sell the materials at a price equal to or less than the 
uranium fuel that is normally used by domestic reactors.55 
Another process deals with the plutonium from Russian weapons.  Generally, two 
methods are used to address this issue.  Some plutonium is re-processed into fuel within 
commercial reactors while the rest is treated in a process known as “vitrification,” in 
 
53 Each ton of plutonium is enough to make 200 nuclear weapons, and a ton of highly enriched uranium is enough for 50 nuclear 
weapons.  The amount pf plutonium that Russia would provide would be in the neighborhood of 10,000 plutonium weapons and 
60,000 uranium weapons.  Garwin and Charpak, supra note 22, at 329. 
54 Sharon Squassoni, Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction: A Survey of Options, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Apr. 
15, 2004), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/32006.pdf. 
55 Id.
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which the material is dissolved within glass.  This glass material can be stored in a 
secure, neutralizing the threat posed by the material. 
3. DOE, DOD, and DOS participation 
The DOE is primarily responsible for the technical processes involved with CTR.  
The Department of Defense (DOD) shares some responsibility on these technical issues, 
but appears to be more of an executive after changes were made to the CTR program 
during the Bush administration: the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), part of 
the DOD, is primarily responsible for the CTR program.56 The State Department (DOS) 
is responsible for the diplomatic aspect of the program.  
4. Implementation (and Difficulties)  
The policy’s implementation was slow.  The Department of Defense (DOD) 
initially had a great deal of discretion with the program’s funds, with the majority of the 
funding going towards security measures for the transportation and storage of nuclear 
weapons in the United States: Armed Service Procurement Regulations prevented the use 
of funding in the former Soviet Union.57 After it became apparent that there were no 
incentives in place for Russian nuclear technicians to act in the best interests of Russia 
and the U.S., the DOE initiated a program between weapon laboratories in the two 
nations.   
There have been other failures in the years since the program’s inception.  The 
Bush Administration has not always been interested in funding the initiative.  Prior to 
9/11, the Bush Administration tried to cut funding; even with the War on Terrorism, the 
 
56 DTRA, DTRA Fact Sheet, available at http://www.dtra.mil/press_resources/fact_sheets/display.cfm?fs=ctr (last updated December 
2004). 
57 Id. at 325 
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Bush Administration has, at times, sought to divert funds for the initiative to other 
programs.58 Finally, one of the great limitations of the program is that it does not address 
the limitations of nuclear facilities in other nations with any great magnitude.  For 
example, the CTR program does not address the problems with nuclear reactors in 
nations such Congo, Uzbekistan, and Ghana.59 
C.  The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
 Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,60 member states agreed to prevent 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons.  It is largely a mixture of commitments regarding 
the oversight of member states (programs which have been in existence since the 1960s) 
and more bold commitments (like the quixotic agreement that all members will 
eventually disarm their nuclear weapons in Article VI). 
Also, the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) is enabled to inspect the 
commercial power activities of member nations.  The treaty underscores the relationship 
 
58 Part of the delay was the result of a diplomatic dispute between Russian and US authorities over a number of issues, notably the 
certification of compliance. Richard Lugar, Cooperative Threat Reduction, available at http://lugar.senate.gov/nunnlugar.html (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2004). 
59 Michael Crowley, Old Guard: W. Forgets the Nuclear Threat, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 9, 2002.  In Congo, the Kinshasa reactor 
is protected by a padlocked metal gate and has been missing a fuel rod since the 1980s.  For a time after  the 1997 coup in Congo, the 
IAEA was unable to inspect the plant.  Id.
60 Treaty for the Non-Proliferation  of Nuclear Weapons, entered into force, March 5, 1970,  21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, 
available at http://www.state.gov/t/np/trty/16281.htm#treaty. [Hereinafter NPT.]  The NPT is up for review next spring.  Steve 
Andreasen, Bush Must Strengthen Nuclear Weapons Treaty, Boston Globe,  Nov. 20, 2004, available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2004/11/20/bush_must_strengthen_nuclear_weapons_treaty?mode
=PF. See also Press Release, State Dep’t, U.S. Cites Response to NPT Noncompliance As Greatest Challenge - Seeks to define 
"central obligation" of the NPT (May 10, 2004), available at 2004 WL 59152186 (discussing US view of central obligation of NPT, 
preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons). 
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between commercial nuclear power and the security risks posed by nuclear technology.  
Another unique function of the NPT is the requirement that all member nations be willing 
to share nuclear energy technology.61 
This treaty illustrates an interesting worldview of the 1960s.  The US and USSR 
were concerned with winning over less developed nations that were in need of energy.  
These nations were limited, due to a lack of natural resources and their large populations, 
in their ability to develop infrastructure and acquire technology.  The US and USSR were 
more than willing to provide development assistance, taking on such projects as the 
Aswan High Dam in Egypt and the projects and assistance provided by the World Bank.  
Nuclear energy was another bargaining chip in the efforts to obtain allies, with the US 
reactors supplying assistance to nations like Congo, and the Cold War powers’ 
willingness to sign a treaty guaranteeing that interest.  
What happened to this enthusiasm for developing nuclear energy technology?  
The most obvious answer is that the Cold War ended, and, to a large degree, so did the 
US need to battle for the allegiance of those powers.  For the US, the post-Cold War 
world was no longer bi-polar, but rather fraught with pariah states like Iran, North Korea, 
and Iraq, who would develop reactors for military purposes.62 This caused a shift from 
concerns over international goodwill to a concern over immediate security threats.  
Secondary causes were the loss of interest in nuclear energy in the US, with fears of 
accidents after Chernobyl, the media coverage of Three Mile Island, and the perceived 
risks of nuclear energy following 9/11.   
 
61 NPT, supra note 43, Art. IV, sec 2 
62 In North Korea, for example, it would seem the end of the Cold War increased the need for security, with the perceived fear of 
threats to the regime. 
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C.  The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
 
The IAEA, based in Vienna, Austria, is a United Nations agency that came under 
fire in the months leading up to the 2002 invasion of Iraq.  The IAEA has three general 
functions: promoting safeguards and verification, promoting safety and security, and 
promoting science and technology. 
In terms of promoting safeguards and verifications, the IAEA has two broad 
functions.  It inspects the nuclear-related facilities of member states and, under the 
auspices of UN Security Council resolutions, has maintained a presence in Iraq to 
monitor nuclear-related events there (although that function no longer exists).63 
With regard to the safety and security function, the IAEA oversees that member 
states have safe nuclear equipment: generally, the IAEA sets safety standards for nuclear 
facilities.64 In the security area, the IAEA attempts to ensure that nuclear materials 
within member states are kept out of the hands of terrorists and those who might obtain 
the technology for military applications.65 
The IAEA, following the philosophy of the NPT, is also mobilized to promote 
science and technology: the IAEA maintains, as part of its mission statement, that it will 
promote exchanges of knowledge regarding nuclear technology towards developing 
nations (for energy and social benefits) and promote the research and development of 
 
63 IAEA, “Our Work: Safeguards and Verification,” available at http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/index.html (last visited Nov. 29, 
2004). 
64 IAEA, “Our Work: Safety and Security,” available at http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SS/index.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2004), 
65 Id. 
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technology related to corresponding nuclear technology issues (food, safety, and radiation 
exposure).66 
The IAEA is severely limited in its amount of funding – its $100 million budget is 
on par with that of a midsize American city.67 Moreover, the budget has seen no real 
growth in seventeen years, even as the IAEA’s mission would seemingly be more 
important in a post-Cold War world.68 The IAEA’s image took some damage during the 
buildup to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, as the Bush Administration’s public relations teams 
mocked Hans Blix and international inspection methods used within Iraq. 
D. Diversion-proof fuel 
A relatively recent proposal would focus on a method that would make nuclear 
power plant spent fuel useless for weapon purposes.  By putting an isotope of americium, 
Am-241, in all new fuel rods, neutrons can be captured while the rods are in the reactor.  
A curium isotope, Cm-242, would be created, and, in turn, this material would eventually 
deteriorate into Pu-238.  If this process is timed appropriately, the theory is that it would 
render spent fuel from weapons useless.69 
There are two policy concerns related to such a solution.  First of all, it would be 
necessary to create a treaty system in which fuel fabrication systems were open to 
inspection.  Second, and a reality that advocates of such a system are quick to point out, 
 
66 IAEA, Our “Work: Promoting Science and Technology,” available at http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/index.html (last accessed 
Nov. 29, 2004). 
67 Michael Crowley, Old Guard: W. Forgets the Nuclear Threat, THE NEW REPUBLIC, at 15 (Sept. 9, 2002). 
68 Id. 
69 Carbon, supra note 17, at 70 
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is that there are very few fuel fabrication plants in the world, making the inspection easy 
to control.70 
E.  Export Controls 
 The DOE has oversight of the export of nuclear technology, including nuclear 
reactors.71 Failure to comply with the export controls carries stiff penalties, such as jail 
time and fines.       
F. Direct Foreign Policy Measures 
The actions of the US through international negotiations and other foreign policy 
acts must be mentioned in any discussion of proliferation.  In the past, the US has used a 
variety of different strategies, depending on the situation.  In the case of Brazil and 
Argentina, the US joined members of the international community to negotiate a series of 
agreements in which the two nations would join the NPT and agree to mutual verification 
measures.72 In 1994, North Korea and the US agreed to shut down of a North Korean 
reprocessing plant in exchange for two light water reactors less suited for weapon 
making.73 Of course, since that time, the US has used a less conciliatory method with 
North Korea, instead choosing to implicitly threaten military action.  A more “hard line” 




71 Atomic Energy Act, 68 STAT. 919 (1954).  The specific regulations are governed by DOE regulations.  10 C.F.R. § 810 (1995). 
 
72 Recent developments deserves special attention as Brazil recently received authorization from the IAEA to enrich uranium  
Raymond Colitt ,  Brazil in deal with nuclear watchdog, FINANCIAL TIMES,, Nov. 26, 2004 available at 2004 WL 100695398.
73 ENERGY, Forget Atoms for Peace, Sept. 22, 2000, at 2 
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V.  Analysis 
 The following is a brief commentary of several major emerging issues related to 
nuclear energy, using the information presented above.   
1) Should the United States promote the use of nuclear energy? 
 This issue turns on the extent to which one believes there is a technologically 
feasible solution to the reprocessing problem within nuclear technology.  The Ford and 
Carter Administrations concluded that there was no such solution and that the risks of 
plutonium proliferation outweighed the benefit of the technology and thus, arguably, 
dealt a serious blow to the research and development aspects of nuclear technology, in 
turn contributing to the change in US policy regarding the promotion of the technology 
worldwide.  It would be interesting to know the feeling of those administrations regarding 
reprocessing technology like IFRs in making such decisions. 
 The benefits of nuclear energy are clear.  It can provide relatively cheap and 
emission-free energy in places that lack sufficient natural resources to provide for their 
population.  As international energy demand continues to rise, nuclear energy is a clear 
answer to offset the corresponding rise in cost.   
Furthermore, the promotion of such technology, if safe, while not serving an 
ideological interest like it did during the Cold War, could serve a more prophylactic 
measure in the future.  Some of the most frightening nations in the world – North Korea, 
Belarus, and Afghanistan – are also extremely limited in their energy infrastructure.  
Even if they could grow, these nations often lack the capability to develop the basic 
services, like sufficient electric access, needed for successful development.  Energy 
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access could serve as preventive measure to the social problems that come with a poor 
economy and contribute to the malaise that enables a regime like the one in North Korea. 
While hardly a guaranteed solution, it seems that nuclear energy could offset those 
problems.  Proliferation safe reactors, whether they be IFRs, thorium reactors, or simple 
light water reactors (which often make the cost of reprocessing too great), would offset 
some of these concerns.  Better international monitoring could also contribute a great deal 
to the proliferation concern. 
2) What measures can be taken to ameliorate the proliferation risks posed by nuclear 
energy? 
Proliferation safe reactors, whether they be IFRs or simple light water reactors 
(which often make the cost of reprocessing too great), would offset proliferation 
concerns.  US policymakers should at least evaluate the possibilities of these 
technologies, rather than relegate them to the present status as Cold War relics. 
Better international monitoring could also contribute a great deal to the 
proliferation concern.  At present, the IAEA is woefully under-funded, given its 
magnificent responsibility of overseeing the safety of nuclear technology around the 
world.  Changes to the organization, whether through an increase in funding or a 
reassignment of the task to another organization, are necessary. 
Finally, the US must choose whether it intends to enforce the NPT, an 
international agreement that sought to limit the military applications of nuclear 
technology.  The US has, at times, failed to live up to other obligations of the agreement 
such as the nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).  If the US wants to seriously pursue the 
28
concerns of nuclear proliferation, it ought to comply with the NPT and encourage other 
nations to follow suit. 
3) Is the present division of labor appropriate within the federal government 
appropriate to address the myriad of issues created by the unique nature of nuclear 
technology? 
Given the analysis presented above, there should be little doubt that the federal 
government’s oversight of nuclear issues should be re-thought, particularly in the realm 
of nuclear proliferation.  The US has failed in implementing a clear strategy to prevent 
future abuses of nuclear technology. 
One idea, following 9/11, is to create a separate White House post, overseeing the 
myriad of DOE, DOD, and DOS programs related to the international trade of nuclear 
materials.74 This “nuclear proliferation czar” would be designed to coordinate the 
respective efforts of the various foreign and domestic policymaking bodies involved with 
proliferation issues, with the overall goal of developing a unified policy. 
The Bush Administration has also proclaimed a “Global Threat Reduction 
Initiative,” which would expand the Nunn-Lugar program.  The program would 
compensate for the external limitations of the existing CTR program, expanding the 
DOE’s anti-proliferation efforts beyond Russia.  The success of this program remains to 
be seen.75 
74  Id. 
75 D.O.E., Global Threat Reduction Initiative Highlights,
http://www.energy.gov/engine/doe/files/dynamic/264200491138_Vienna_GTR_Fact%20Sheet_FINAL1_052604%20.pdf (discussing 
the Bush Administration Global Threat Reduction Initiative), last visited Dec. 1, 2004.  See also Sharon Sqausonni, Globalizing 
Cooperative Threat Reduction, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Apr. 15, 2004) (available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/32006.pdf)(describing specific measures to expand CTR programs). 
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In line with the issue of coordination, the US, if it chooses to promote nuclear 
energy, ought to be a leader in developing safer civilian applications of the technology, 
promoting the use of technology like integral fast reactors, thorium reactors, and 
diversion proof fuel.  Some have argued that sharing this technology is an obligation 
under the NPT.76 
VI. Conclusion: Two Broad Observations on Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Proliferation 
 This analysis also warrants two additional observations on nuclear energy worth 
noting.  First, one of the more striking aspects of the last two decades is the lack of 
legitimate research and development into nuclear energy.  The US has always been a 
world leader in technological development and, not surprisingly, research and 
development into nuclear energy began to slow around the time that the US ended its 
research.  In the US, following the decision to ban reprocessing, there was some 
experimentation with IFRs, but even that research has been dormant for over a decade.  
As the development has subsided, so too has the US interest in nuclear energy, given the 
prospect of more decommissioning of plants on the horizon without an offsetting increase 
in the number of plant applications.  There have been no new ideas and thus no new 
policies.  If the argument that nuclear energy is a necessary step to offset the increased 
international demand is correct, then any policy that does not take those technological 
development issues into account is a mistake. 
 Second, the problems related to nuclear energy and proliferation will not go away 
under the current policy framework.  Foreign nations will still need energy and, 
occasionally, a state will attempt to increase its hegemony through the development of 
 
76 Seth Grae, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s Obligation to Transfer Peaceful Nuclear Technology: One Proposal of a 
Technology, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1985, 1998 (1996). 
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nuclear weapons.77 This reality demands vigilance regarding the problems of 
proliferation.  One commentator, ranking nuclear proliferation as the most serious risk 
associated with nuclear energy, explained a method for evaluating the risk associated 
with nuclear proliferation: 
[The] risk, in the formal sense, is the product of the probability of a 
harmful event times the consequences of the event if it takes place.  Now, 
we do not know exactly how much the spread of nuclear power 
contributes to the probability of nuclear war, but it is certainly not 
inconceivable that the probability of nuclear war is already [one percent] 
per year and that the spread of nuclear power could double that figure in 
the short term . . . If nuclear power adds a probability of [one percent] per 
year to the chances of nuclear war, and recognizing that the consequences 
of nuclear war could include the deaths . . . of billions of people, then the 
“expected value” associated with that risk – that is, the probability times 
the consequences – is very large indeed.78 
There is no clear way to evaluate the risk of a nuclear accident, much less the risk 
posed by nuclear proliferation.  The lack of a tangible means of evaluating the probability 
of such incidents is not a reason to ignore the problem.  If nuclear energy is a necessary 
step in addressing the rising energy demand worldwide, it will take an investment in the 
future to protect the world from dangers posed by nuclear proliferation.  Allowing 
examples like the Kinshasa reactor mentioned in the introduction to discourage a policy 
that pursues the safe development of nuclear energy is a mistake. 
 
77 Recently, Iran again made the news with allegations from the US State department over their use of nuclear technology.  The IAEA 
stepped in and felt comfortable with the result of its oversight.  The Bush administration soon responded with allegations that the 
nuclear reactors in Iraq were being used for military purposes.  
78 JOHN P. HOLDREN, PERSPECTIVES ON ENERGY (Lon C. Ruedisili and Morris W. Firebaugh, ed. 1982), 374. 
